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1. The concept of mass and the mystery of matter
The following formal principle is true of the concept of mass:
Pl For all particulars X and moments of time t: if X exists at t,
then the mass of X at t is either 0 or greater than 0.
Note that Pl is not trivial. Consider an X which is such that the
mass of X at a moment of time t is neither 0 nor greater than 0 -
which means (with negative mass being ruled out) that one cannot
really speak of “the mass of X at t”. For such an X, Pl allows to con­
clude that X is not a particular that exists at t, which logically im­
plies the following disjunction: that X is either not a particular, or a
particular that is (simpliciter) non-existent (i.e., that does not exist
at any moment of time), or a particular that is non-existent at t but
exists at some other moment of time. Of these three alternatives, I
only rule out the second one, by postulating:
P2 Every particular exists (simpliciter, i.e., exists at least at
some moment of time).
The spirit in which I would like P2 to be taken is well captured if, in
P2, one reads “every particular” as “every particular taken into ac­
count here (in this essay)”.
And there is another preliminary remark. Since the adjective
“persistent”, in connection to “particular”, will occur many times
in this essay, apparently marking an important characteristic, a
definition of “persistent” in connection to “particular” had better
be given: a particular is persistent if, and only if, the moments of its
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existence form at least one gapless stretch of time (where a stretch of
time is taken to consist of more than one moment of time).
But now, what is mass? The question has a straightforward
first answer: mass is the quantity of matter. But what is matter? It is
a surprising fact that we don’t really know; we only know the ef­
fects of matter (and we measure the quantity of matter -  mass -  on
the basis of those effects). On the one hand, matter is whatever is
wholly responsible in a persistent material particular for its offer­
ing resistance -  only to be overcome by force -  to being accelerated;
and whatever is partly responsible in a persistent material particu­
lar for its offering resistance to being penetrated or deformed (in
the cases of resistance to penetration and deformation, the geo­
metrical structure of the persistent material particular is the other,
also partly responsible factor). In this perspective, matter is an anti-
dynamical factor. On the other hand, matter is also whatever is
wholly responsible for the gravitational force a persistent material
particular exerts on other persistent material particulars (acceler­
ating them). In this perspective, matter is also a dynamical factor.
We also know today that the constancy of matter, which the
medievals ascribed to heavenly bodies, is likely to be found quite
on the other side of the size-scale of persistent material particu­
lars: in the elementary particles (the ancient atomists, of course,
had a hunch of this fact). Each electron, for example, has a con­
stant mass (in fact, each electron has the same constant mass), and
this seems to indicate that also the matter of each electron is con­
stant during the entire course of its existence. But as soon as we
come to the level of macro-physical persistent material particulars,
constancy of mass or matter is to be had, if at all, only in approxi­
mation. In fact, since the matter of a macro-physical persistent ma­
terial particular X at a moment of time t is the aggregation of the
constant matters of all elementary particles that go into building X
at t (let’s assume the constancy of matter of these particles), it is
clear that the matter of X at time t+J may have nothing in common
with the matter of X at t -  because no elementary particle that goes
into building X at t+A is an elementary particle that already went
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into building X at t.1 This possibility is in fact realized in special
persistent material particulars: organisms (with sufficient longevi-
ty).
1 Nevertheless, the mass of X at t+A (i.e., the quantity of the matter of X at t+d)
may well be more or less the same as the mass of X at t (the quantity of the
matter of X at t).
Due to Einstein’s special theory of relativity, we also know
today that matter is a special form of energy and can under certain
circumstances be wholly transformed into thermic and kinetic en­
ergy (thus, the quantity of matter in the physical world is not pre­
served; only the quantity of energy in the physical world is pre­
served -  assuming that the physical world is a closed system). But
all of this does not really tell us what matter is. The usual material­
ist is full of contempt for everything mysterious -  an ontological
contempt that makes him move on to denying the existence of
what he contemns; it should give him pause that matter is mysteri­
ous.
2. Is matter a principium individuationis?
Matter is a principium individuationis for elementary particles X and
Y - unfortunately, an entirely useless one, since we cannot recog­
nize as identical or distinguish the matter of X and the matter of Y
without recognizing as identical or distinguishing X and Y. But
matter is not a principium individuationis - not even a useless one -
for persistent material particulars in general. The matter of X at
moment of time t and the matter of Y at moment of time t' are,
whether these matters are identical or different, neither sufficient
for determining that X and Y are identical, nor for determining
that they are different:
If the matter of X at t is identical with the matter of Y at t', it
does not follow that X is identical with Y (and of course it does also
not follow that X and Y are different from each other). - This is ob­
vious if f  ± t. For the special case that t' = t, consider (a) Tibbles,
who has a tail before t (= t'), but none at t ' (= t), and (b) Tib, who is
Tibbles always without her tail. The matter of Tibbles at t' is identical
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with the matter of Tib at t'; nevertheless, Tibbles is not identical
with Tib.
If the matter of X at t is different from the matter of Y at t', it
does not follow that X is different from Y (and of course it does also
not follow that they are identical to each other). -  This is true; but
if one makes the extra assumption that t' = t, then, indeed, “X is dif­
ferent from Y” follows from “the matter of X at t is different from
the matter of Y at f ”.
The case of Tib and Tibbles is an unusual version of a usual
phenomenon: several persistent material particulars (sometimes
indefinitely many) share the same matter at a given moment of
time: consider (1) this statue, (2) this lump of bronze, (3) this gag­
gle of copper and and tin atoms. (1), (2), and (3) have the same mat­
ter at a given moment of time, but (2) and (3) may still exist when
(1) doesn’t, and (3) may still exists when (1) and (2) don’t. Thus, the
statue, the lump of bronze, and the gaggle of atoms are three dif­
ferent persistent material particulars.
One might prima facie believe that although the identity of
matter at time t is not in general sufficient for making persistent
material particulars identical, the identity of spatial location at time
t is in general sufficient for this. But this, too, is not the case -  as is,
again, shown by Tib and Tibbles, and by the statue and the lump of
bronze. There is, moreover, a deep problem connected with the
spatial location of persistent material particulars and, as a conse­
quence, also with the quantity of that spatial location, the volume of
persistent material particulars: the further one goes into the mi­
cro-structure of such objects, the further their precise spatial loca­
tion -  if it is to be determined on purely objective, physical
grounds -  evaporates.2 The problem can be put in terms of a para­
dox:
2 Cf. Uwe Meixner, “The Non-Physicalness of Material Objects”, in Unity and
Time in Metaphysics, ed. E. Runggaldier et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter 2009): 47-51.
On purely objective, physical grounds, the precise spatial lo­
cation of a persistent material particular X at a moment t of
time is the region RO(m(t, X), t) o f space, in other words: the
region of space that is precisely occupied at t by the matter of
X at t. But every region R o f space that is a candidate for
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RO(m(t, X), t) contains empty space.3 Therefore, R is not pre­
cisely occupied at t by the matter of X at t, and therefore R is
not RO(m(t, X), t).
3 This is what we find, and indeed it seems that it cannot be otherwise, if  it
were otherwise, the density of X at t would be infinite; but, of course, the den­
sity of X at t is not infinite. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to suspect that
RO(m(t, X), t) does not exist as intended: that “RO(m(t, X), t)” does not have a
referent that corresponds to its meaning. But where, then, is matter? The dif­
ficulty of locating matter is a not inconsiderable part of the mystery of matter.
4 Cf. Meixner, “The Non-Physicalness of Material Objects” : 51-55.
5 Remember P2.
The best solution to this paradox, I submit, is that the precise spa­
tial location of a persistent material particular X at a given time t is
not determined on purely objective, physical grounds, and is not
RO(m(t, X), t). It is also determined by us and differs considerably
from RO(m(t, X), t) (which, very likely, does not exist as intended; cf.
footnote 3). It is a certain irony of the history of philosophy that
Descartes called persistent material particulars -  wholly material
ones in his eyes - res extensae, separating them from us, who -  in
his eyes -  are persistent wholly immaterial res cogitantes. It can, of
course, hardly be denied that persistent material particulars are
extended. But their precise extension is not only dependent on tem­
perature and pressure, but also on our deciding how far they are ex­
tended, that is, on our deciding what counts as their territory, and
what does not.4 Empty space is bound to be involved in that terri­
tory. Since empty space is immaterial (i.e., wholly immaterial), it
may, therefore, be reasonably proposed that no persistent material
particular is wholly material.
3. Hylomorphic functions and the identity and unity of materi­
al particulars
Every (existing5) material particular X is represented by a hylomor­
phic function 6(X) as follows:
8
The domain of 0(X) comprises the moments of time at which
X exists, and 0(X) assigns values to those moments of time in
the following manner:
(i) if t is a moment of time at which X exists and which is such
that the mass of X at t is greater than zero, then 0(x)(t) = <m,
f>, where fis at t the form of X and m the matter that is at t in
union with fin  X (i.e., the matter ofX at t).
(ii) If t is a moment of time at which X exists and which is
such that the mass of X at t is zero, then 0(X)(t) = <0, />,
where fis  at t the form of X and 0  the empty set.
While clause (i) is always necessary, clause (ii) may not be necessary
for a given material particular. It is not necessary, for example, if X
is a persistent material particular, for the mass of a persistent mate­
rial particular is at any moment of its existence greater than 0. The
representation of material particulars by hylomorphic functions
makes it particularly easy to see, (a), in which manners material
particulars may be different from each other and yet partially
identical, and, (b), what is really sufficient for their being identical:
P3 For all (existing) material particulars X and Y: if 0(X) =
0(Y), then X = Y (where 0(x) and 0(Y) are functions that, in
the manner just described, represent X and Y).
It is to be supposed that there are many more hylomorphic func­
tions than there are material particulars. Presumably not every re­
striction of a given material-particular-representing hylomorphic
function represents, in its turn, a material particular; yet it is a hy­
lomorphic function. And consider a function 0' that assigns, to
each moment t of time in some non-empty set of such moments M'
(which serves as the domain of 0'),
an ordered pair <m, f>, where m and f  are such that for some
(existing) material particular X the following is true: fis at t the
form of X and m the matter that is at t in union with fin  X.
0 ' is a hylomorphic function; but it may well be the case that it
does not represent any material particular: because its course of
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values may easily turn out to be a patchwork derived from many
different material particulars -  a patchwork that cannot be as­
signed to any one material particular. Thus, each hylomorphic
function that represents a material particular X also displays the spe­
cific principle of unity that belongs to X. And vice versa: if a hylo­
morphic function displays a specific principle of unity P, then it al­
so represents the material particular to which P belongs. It is no
misuse of the term “essence” to call the principle of unity that be­
longs to a material particular the essence of that particular.
Typically, the principle of unity of a material particular X is
diachronic: it is not already determined by a single value of the hy­
lomorphic function of X; only in the case of momentary material
particulars (if there are such things) is the respective principle of
unity non-diachronic. Note that even though the principle of unity
of a non-momentary material particular is diachronic, it cannot be
without a synchronic (hence momentarily determined) element if
the particular’s time of existence has a first moment. For without
such an element, it would be indeterminate when the particular
comes into existence; the presence of the synchronic element is
necessary, and sufficient, for establishing the beginning of the ma­
terial particular’s existence.
Any persistent material particular can be classified according
to whether the values <m, f> of its hylomorphic function are (i) dia-
chronically constant in both the first and the second component,
(ii) diachronically constant in the first, but not in the second com­
ponent, (iii) diachronically constant in the second, but not in the
first component, (iv) diachronically constant neither in the first
nor in the second component. An individual (mere) portion of matter
(it need not be a spatially coherent portion) is a degenerate material
particular (i.e., one that is identical to its matter), and it is a mate­
rial particular which is only very indirectly accessible to human
cognition. Yet it is (at least normally) a persistent material particu­
lar, and necessarily such that the first component of the values of its
hylomorphic function is diachronically constant (otherwise it would
not always be this selfsame portion of matter), whereas the second
component of the values of its hylomorphic function can, in the
course of time, vary very widely indeed (it can, but it needn’t). In
contrast, a neutron is a persistent material particular, and neces­
sarily such that both components of the values of its hylomorphic
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function are diachronically constant. A neutron is at all times of its
existence composed of the same matter and the same form, in oth­
er words: the form of the neutron is at any moment t of the neu­
tron’s existence the same, and the matter that is at t in union with
that form in the neutron is the same, too. Most persistent material
particulars, however, are neither like portions of matter nor like
neutrons. While the second component of the values of the hylo-
morphic function of the Ship of Theseus varies only slightly, the first
component of those values varies considerably in the course of
time, to such a degree that at a later moment of the Ship’s exist­
ence it has nothing in common with what it was at an earlier mo­
ment of that existence. And if we come to a living organism, then no
diachronically constant, or approximately diachronically constant,
element in the values of its hylomorphic function is readily dis­
cernible. This means that the principle of unity of such a persistent
material particular is not readily discernible. The traditional hylo-
morphistic answer to the question of what constitutes the unity of
a living organism is, of course, this: the principle of unity of an or­
ganism is the organism’s soul. However, it rather seems that an or­
ganism’s soul is an effect of the organism’s unity (emergent from it,
and perhaps a safeguard for it),6 and not that the organism’s unity
is an effect of the organism’s soul.
6 A theory of the soul along these lines can be found in Uwe Meixner, The Two
Sides of Being. A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (Paderborn: Mentis,
2004), in chapters VIII, IX, and X.
4. Are some particulars immaterial?
There is a longstanding phobia, though not always of the same
strength and extent, in Western philosophy against immaterial en­
tities -  either against regarding the specimens of a given kind as
immaterial, while leaving the exemplification of the kind (i.e., its
having specimens, its being exemplified) untouched; or, if it seems
impossible to regard the specimens of the kind as material, then
against its very exemplification. It is obviously absurd to regard
abstract entities as material (they are wholly immaterial). Accord­
ingly, it has been proposed (by many philosophers, not a few of
them in most centuries, their number increasing in recent times)
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that the kind Abstract Entity is not exemplified (has no specimens);
it has, in other words, been denied that any entity is abstract.7 It
seems, moreover, that specimens of the God-kind are bound to be
immaterial; however, it is certainly not as obviously absurd to re­
gard gods as material as it is absurd to regard abstract entities as
material. Accordingly, we find, in the course of the centuries, a di­
vided phobic reaction against this case of prima facie immateriality
in an ontological species. Most of the philosophers who have a
problem with the God-kind (and there are many such philosophers,
very many in recent times) deny that this kind is exemplified, in
other words, they propose that nothing is a god (not even God). But
a small minority of those philosophers does believe that the God­
kind has a specimen, in fact, a single one -  which, however, they
deem to be (in contrast to what is believed by other, normal mono­
theists) a material entity: the World, or Nature. There are, finally,
fairly strong indications that human persons, too, are bound to be
immaterial. However, in this case, there is much more room (and
motivation) than in the case of abstract entities and gods for con­
tending that, on the contrary, the specimens of the kind in ques­
tion are, in fact, material. Accordingly, we again find, in the course
of the centuries, a divided phobic reaction; but in this further case
of prima facie immateriality in an ontological species, majority and
minority in the phobic reaction against it are distributed inversely
to the previously considered case: In the case of the God-kind, elim­
inati vists (deniers of God/gods) formed the majority, non-
eliminativists (“materializers” of God/gods) the minority; in the
case of Human Person, non-eliminativists (“materializers” of human
persons) form the majority, eliminativists (deniers of human per­
sons) the minority (a fairly small one).
7 if this were true, then all admitted singular terms that are meant to desig­
nate an abstract entity (like “4”, "the Pythagorean theorem”, "the perfect
circle”) would not refer at all, or at least would not have a referent that cor­
responds to their meaning (i.e., would not refer as intended).
But is it the case that some entities are immaterial? Everyone
who accepts abstract entities cannot deny that, indeed, some enti­
ties are immaterial. And some properties are immaterial if  some
particular is immaterial, because an immaterial particular is bound
to have some properties that literally, not analogically, apply to it -
which properties are immaterial in virtue of this. But are there
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immaterial particulars? Well, yes. There are even concrete, non­
abstract immaterial particulars: every region of space is a persis­
tent immaterial particular. Some readers will no doubt balk at the
idea that regions of space are particulars, and would continue to do
so even if regions of space were understood to be coherent regions that
have the form of geometrical solids (the better known among which
are cubes, spheres, pyramids, etc.). But, really, there is no good
reason to deny that regions of space are particulars; there is for
this denial just the bad (phobic) reason that regions of space would
be immaterial particulars if they were particulars.8
8 The immateriality of regions of space is evident in the case of empty regions
of space, but the character of immateriality is still there when a region of
space is non-empty. Filling a region of space with matter does not turn it into a
material entity -  just as joining a soul to a body does not turn it (the soul) in­
to a material entity.
9 Cf. Meixner, The Two Sides of Being: 85-121.
20 Note that the thesis of the possibility o f ontological idealism is not the thesis
of the truth of ontological idealism.
However, if human persons were immaterial particulars (con­
trary to classical Christian hylomorphism), then this would cer­
tainly be a much more exciting bit of news than the truth that re­
gions of space are immaterial particulars. Here are two arguments
for conferring on human persons the status of immaterial particu­
lar; one argument is a priori, the other a posteriori:
The a priori argument9
Let X be a human person. While X experiences the physical
world in just the way X in fact experiences it, the entire phys­
ical world might not exist [thesis of the possibility of ontological
idealism].10 Therefore: It might be the case that X exists while
the entire physical world does not exist. Therefore: It is pos­
sible that X is not a physical entity. But if X were a physical
entity, then X would be a physical entity necessarily [thesis of
the essentiality of physicalness]. Therefore, X is not a physical
entity. Therefore, X is not a material entity. Therefore, X is an
immaterial entity. But X is certainly a particular [by the thesis
of the individuality of persons]. Therefore, X is an immaterial
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particular. Therefore: Every human person is an immaterial par­
ticular.
The a posteriori argument11
11 Cf. Uwe Meixner, “Materialism Does Not Save the Phenomena -  and the Al­
ternative Which Does”, in The Waning of Materialism, eds. R. C. Koons and G.
Bealer (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 418-422.
12 Suppose I aim a gun. Draw the line that connects the target-point and the
sights on the gun I aim. Draw many such lines for various aimed-at target­
points -  with me not moving my head when aiming at this or that target­
point. Where all these lines converge, there is my perspective-point, or ra­
ther, my perspective-region, 0.
Let X be a human person. At any moment of time at which X
undergoes visual experience, X sees the world from a certain
very small region of space, 0 (this origin of X’s perspective in
X’s visual experience can be objectively determined).12 And if
X sees the world from 0 at the moment t of time, then X is in
0 at t: 0 is X’s location at t, as precisely as that location is de­
terminable (it is not the region of space that is at t occupied
by X’s body). But the physical entities one finds in 0 at t are
certainly not X. Therefore, X is not a physical entity. There­
fore, X is not a material entity. Therefore, X is an immaterial
entity. But X is certainly a particular. Therefore, X is an im­
material particular. Therefore: Every human person is an imma­
terial particular.
Both these arguments use the expressions “material particular”
and “immaterial particular” in such a sense as to make right, to the
extent this is possible, what is said in them. The logic of both argu­
ments seems correct. But both these argument have premises (oth­
erwise they would not be arguments), and premises can be criti­
cized, However, unless a premise of an argument is criticized on
grounds that have nothing to do with the fact that one does not be­
lieve in the argument’s conclusion, such criticism has few creden­
tials. It is legitimate -  indeed rationally unavoidable -  that a disbe­
liever in the conclusion of a logically correct argument rejects the
conjunction of the premises. But this rejection is, in itself, just the
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adoption of a stance, not a rationally obligating criticism of the ar­
gument.
What, then, might be said against the premises of the above
arguments without making use of the conclusion-denying assump­
tion that human persons are material particulars? What can be said
in a non-question-begging way against the three theses on which the
a priori argument rests (the names of the theses are given in the ar­
gument itself: in square brackets, in italics)? Every one of those
theses is plausible enough; together, however, they logically imply
what, to many philosophers, can only be anathema. The premises of
the a posteriori argument are even more plausible than the premis­
es of the a priori argument. They are just about unassailable. Note
that it is a move utterly ad hoc to propose that X is not in the place
from where X looks at the world. If I am not there, where am I then?
If the answer is “nowhere”, then it is even clearer than if the an­
swer is “somewhere” that I am not a material particular. If the an­
swer is “where my body is”, then this answer is roughly true, just as
it is roughly true that I am where the Earth is. But neither the loca­
tion of the Earth nor the location of my body are my precise spatial
location (otherwise, the Atlantic would not be closer to me than
Antarctica; otherwise, my nose would not be closer to me than my
feet). The situation does not essentially improve if it be claimed
that I am where my brain is: the origin of my perspective is much
smaller than my brain and, for that matter, much smaller than the
region of the physical goings-on (whatever they are) that make up
the neural correlate of my visual experience. I, a persistent par­
ticular, do now have a precise spatial location (in the sense that it
cannot be made yet more precise; it is precisely the position from
where I would aim a gun -  if I aimed a gun). But no material partic­
ular that is in that location is me. Therefore, I am not a material
particular -  but an immaterial one.13 Admittedly, the location from
where it seems to me that I look at the world may not be the real lo­
cation from where I look at the world. Consider, however, that I
rely on that seeming (and my reliance on it would be a particularly
heavy one if I aimed a gun), and so far that seeming has proved en­
tirely reliable (in my personal history, I cannot recall one instance
13 Note that the a posteriori argument shows that being spatially located does
not contradict immateriality. But this is not as surprising as it may seem at
first sight: spatial regions, too, are immaterial and spatially located.
15
where it was not reliable). Experience is fallible, and so is the expe­
rience that underlies the a posteriori argument; but fallibility, by
itself, is not a sufficient reason to distrust experience, or any par­
ticular experience.14
14 In Daniel Dennett’s “Where am I?” -  in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on
Mind and Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 310-323 -  Dennett’s
brain remote-controls the rest of Dennett’s body, the two being spatially sep­
arated (sometimes by hundreds of miles). But where is Dennett in this
thought-experiment (i.e., the person to which Dennett refers by using the
word “I”)? The best answer, I submit, is that Dennett is, also in this unusual
case, in the place from where he looks at the world, and that this place is the
place from where it seems to him that he looks at it. When, for example, he is
looking at his own brain in the bubbling fluid in the glass-vat, he is in the
place from where he looks at his brain, this place being the place from where
it seems to him that he looks at his brain. If he, in the thought-experiment,
had suicidal intentions, he might suddenly produce a gun and aim it at his
brain -  and he would aim the gun from the very location he is in, which is the
location from where he looks at his brain; which is the location from where it
seems to him that he looks at it. That location is a small spatial region not far
behind his eyes -  with nothing physical in it that might with any plausibility
be Dennett. Now, at one point in Dennett’s thought-experiment the non­
cerebral part of Dennett’s body dies. Where is Dennett in this case? The best
answer is that, though his brain is where it was, in the glass-vat, still support­
ing Dennett’s (rather reduced) existence, he himself -  with all sensory data
gone -  is where it seems to him he is: nowhere. (Some may say that in reality
he is somewhere in his brain. But this is an a priori position without any phe­
nomenological support, a position which is due to the questionable a priori
premise that human persons are where the physical causal bases of their ex­
istence are.)
It is easier to cast doubt on the conclusions of the arguments
(in fact, it’s the same conclusion for both arguments) than to criti­
cize their respective premises in a more direct way. Such a move, if
not simply consisting in the allegation that the conclusion is false
or at least implausible, is rationally obligating (that is, it rationally
- not morally, of course -  obligates the proponent of the argument
to give an adequate response). But one should be careful that it is
the right assertion one attacks. The arguments do not assert in
their conclusion that human beings are immaterial particulars (such
an assertion would be false, of course, since it is beyond reasonable
doubt that human beings -  qua organisms -  are material particu­
lars); both arguments speak of human persons, and implicitly distin­
guish the human person from the human being. Moreover, the ar-
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guments do not assert that human persons are immortal; they do
not even assert that human persons can in the natural course of na­
ture exist without their bodies.15 They arrive only at the conclusion
that human persons are immaterial particulars -  and this does not
by itself preclude that, in the natural course of nature, human per­
sons have bodies and need a (living) body for their existence, and
that, by natural necessity, human persons cease to exist when their
bodies cease to exist.
15 Note that the a posteriori argument says nothing at all (not even in its prem­ises) about the possibility (logical, metaphysical, or natural) of existencewithout a body.16 See Uwe Meixner, “New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception o f MentalCausation” , Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2008): 17-22.
But would I not lack causal power if I really were an immate­
rial particular? This query presupposes that immaterial particulars
have no causal power, which presupposition, in turn, presupposes
that matter -  which is what immaterial particulars do not have -  is
the source of all causal power that a particular may have. But such
an assumption seems arbitrary. For the greater part of the history
of philosophy it was in fact believed that matter is so far from be­
ing the source of ail causal power that it is totally inert in the causal
respect. In view of the scientific fact that matter is a special form of
energy and exerts gravitational force, that belief can no longer be
upheld Qust as it cannot be upheld that matter is totally passive and
indifferent with respect to the form it acquires at a given moment of
time). But it does not follow that matter is the source of all causal
power.
If (some) immaterial particulars are to have causal powers
that are effective in the physical world (which seems to be the only
way to hold their reality in proper esteem), then their having such
causal powers must, of course, be compatible with the Law of the
Preservation of (Physical) Energy. Although it is often denied,
there is, in fact, conceptual room enough both for according such
causal powers to immaterial particulars and for respecting the laws
of physics.16
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